On the map-territory fallacy fallacy
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arXiv
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| Autori principali: | , , |
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| Natura: | Preprint |
| Pubblicazione: |
2022
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| _version_ | 1866915353796280320 |
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| author | Ramstead, Maxwell J D Sakthivadivel, Dalton A R Friston, Karl J |
| author_facet | Ramstead, Maxwell J D Sakthivadivel, Dalton A R Friston, Karl J |
| contents | This paper presents a meta-theory of the usage of the free energy principle (FEP) and examines its scope in the modelling of physical systems. We consider the so-called `map-territory fallacy' and the fallacious reification of model properties. By showing that the FEP is a consistent, physics-inspired theory of inferences of inferences, we disprove the assertion that the map-territory fallacy contradicts the principled usage of the FEP. As such, we argue that deploying the map-territory fallacy to criticise the use of the FEP and Bayesian mechanics itself constitutes a fallacy: what we call the {\it map-territory fallacy fallacy}. In so doing, we emphasise a few key points: the uniqueness of the FEP as a model of particles or agents that model their environments; the restoration of convention to the FEP via its relation to the principle of constrained maximum entropy; the `Jaynes optimality' of the FEP under this relation; and finally, the way that this meta-theoretical approach to the FEP clarifies its utility and scope as a formal modelling tool. Taken together, these features make the FEP, uniquely, {\it the} ideal model of generic systems in statistical physics. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2208_06924 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2022 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | On the map-territory fallacy fallacy Ramstead, Maxwell J D Sakthivadivel, Dalton A R Friston, Karl J History and Philosophy of Physics Statistical Mechanics This paper presents a meta-theory of the usage of the free energy principle (FEP) and examines its scope in the modelling of physical systems. We consider the so-called `map-territory fallacy' and the fallacious reification of model properties. By showing that the FEP is a consistent, physics-inspired theory of inferences of inferences, we disprove the assertion that the map-territory fallacy contradicts the principled usage of the FEP. As such, we argue that deploying the map-territory fallacy to criticise the use of the FEP and Bayesian mechanics itself constitutes a fallacy: what we call the {\it map-territory fallacy fallacy}. In so doing, we emphasise a few key points: the uniqueness of the FEP as a model of particles or agents that model their environments; the restoration of convention to the FEP via its relation to the principle of constrained maximum entropy; the `Jaynes optimality' of the FEP under this relation; and finally, the way that this meta-theoretical approach to the FEP clarifies its utility and scope as a formal modelling tool. Taken together, these features make the FEP, uniquely, {\it the} ideal model of generic systems in statistical physics. |
| title | On the map-territory fallacy fallacy |
| topic | History and Philosophy of Physics Statistical Mechanics |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2208.06924 |