Random Assignment of Indivisible Goods under Constraints
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arXiv
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| Autori principali: | , , |
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| Natura: | Preprint |
| Pubblicazione: |
2022
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| _version_ | 1866929647091974144 |
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| author | Kawase, Yasushi Sumita, Hanna Yokoi, Yu |
| author_facet | Kawase, Yasushi Sumita, Hanna Yokoi, Yu |
| contents | We investigate the problem of random assignment of indivisible goods, in which each agent has an ordinal preference and a constraint. Our goal is to characterize the conditions under which there always exists a random assignment that simultaneously satisfies efficiency and envy-freeness. The probabilistic serial mechanism ensures the existence of such an assignment for the unconstrained setting. In this paper, we consider a more general setting in which each agent can consume a set of items only if the set satisfies her feasibility constraint. Such constraints must be taken into account in student course placements, employee shift assignments, and so on. We demonstrate that an efficient and envy-free assignment may not exist even for the simple case of partition matroid constraints, where the items are categorized, and each agent demands one item from each category. We then identify special cases in which an efficient and envy-free assignment always exists. For these cases, the probabilistic serial cannot be naturally extended; therefore, we provide mechanisms to find the desired assignment using various approaches. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2208_07666 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2022 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Random Assignment of Indivisible Goods under Constraints Kawase, Yasushi Sumita, Hanna Yokoi, Yu Computer Science and Game Theory Theoretical Economics We investigate the problem of random assignment of indivisible goods, in which each agent has an ordinal preference and a constraint. Our goal is to characterize the conditions under which there always exists a random assignment that simultaneously satisfies efficiency and envy-freeness. The probabilistic serial mechanism ensures the existence of such an assignment for the unconstrained setting. In this paper, we consider a more general setting in which each agent can consume a set of items only if the set satisfies her feasibility constraint. Such constraints must be taken into account in student course placements, employee shift assignments, and so on. We demonstrate that an efficient and envy-free assignment may not exist even for the simple case of partition matroid constraints, where the items are categorized, and each agent demands one item from each category. We then identify special cases in which an efficient and envy-free assignment always exists. For these cases, the probabilistic serial cannot be naturally extended; therefore, we provide mechanisms to find the desired assignment using various approaches. |
| title | Random Assignment of Indivisible Goods under Constraints |
| topic | Computer Science and Game Theory Theoretical Economics |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2208.07666 |