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Maximum Stable Matching with Matroids and Partial Orders

Fuente: arXiv

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Dettagli Bibliografici
Autori principali:	Csáji, Gergely, Király, Tamás, Yokoi, Yu
Natura:	Preprint
Pubblicazione:	2022
Soggetti:	Computer Science and Game Theory
Accesso online:	Acceder al recurso
Tags:	Aggiungi Tag Nessun Tag, puoi essere il primo ad aggiungerne!!

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