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On the Trail of Lost Pennies: player-funded tug-of-war on the integers

Fuente: arXiv

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Autor principal:	Hammond, Alan
Formato:	Preprint
Publicado:	2022
Materias:	Probability Computer Science and Game Theory Theoretical Economics
Acceso en línea:	Acceder al recurso
Etiquetas:	Agregar Etiqueta Sin Etiquetas, Sea el primero en etiquetar este registro!

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