Rank-preserving Multidimensional Mechanisms: an equivalence between identical-object and heterogeneous-object models
Fuente:
arXiv
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| Autores principales: | , |
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| Formato: | Preprint |
| Publicado: |
2022
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| _version_ | 1866911991570890752 |
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| author | Bikhchandani, Sushil Mishra, Debasis |
| author_facet | Bikhchandani, Sushil Mishra, Debasis |
| contents | We show that the mechanism-design problem for a monopolist selling multiple, heterogeneous objects to a buyer with ex ante symmetric and additive values is equivalent to the mechanism-design problem for a monopolist selling identical objects to a buyer with decreasing marginal values. We derive three new results for the identical-objects model: (i) a new condition for revenue monotonicity of stochastic mechanisms, (ii) a sufficient condition on priors, such that prices in optimal deterministic mechanism are not increasing, and (iii) a simplification of incentive constraints for deterministic mechanisms. We use the equivalence to establish corresponding results in the heterogeneous-objects model. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2209_10137 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2022 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Rank-preserving Multidimensional Mechanisms: an equivalence between identical-object and heterogeneous-object models Bikhchandani, Sushil Mishra, Debasis Theoretical Economics Computer Science and Game Theory We show that the mechanism-design problem for a monopolist selling multiple, heterogeneous objects to a buyer with ex ante symmetric and additive values is equivalent to the mechanism-design problem for a monopolist selling identical objects to a buyer with decreasing marginal values. We derive three new results for the identical-objects model: (i) a new condition for revenue monotonicity of stochastic mechanisms, (ii) a sufficient condition on priors, such that prices in optimal deterministic mechanism are not increasing, and (iii) a simplification of incentive constraints for deterministic mechanisms. We use the equivalence to establish corresponding results in the heterogeneous-objects model. |
| title | Rank-preserving Multidimensional Mechanisms: an equivalence between identical-object and heterogeneous-object models |
| topic | Theoretical Economics Computer Science and Game Theory |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2209.10137 |