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Rank-preserving Multidimensional Mechanisms: an equivalence between identical-object and heterogeneous-object models

Fuente: arXiv

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Détails bibliographiques
Auteurs principaux:	Bikhchandani, Sushil, Mishra, Debasis
Format:	Preprint
Publié:	2022
Sujets:	Theoretical Economics Computer Science and Game Theory
Accès en ligne:	Acceder al recurso
Tags:	Ajouter un tag Pas de tags, Soyez le premier à ajouter un tag!

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