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Bayesian Mechanism Design for Blockchain Transaction Fee Allocation

Fuente: arXiv

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors:	Chen, Xi, Simchi-Levi, David, Zhao, Zishuo, Zhou, Yuan
Format:	Preprint
Published:	2022
Subjects:	Computer Science and Game Theory
Online Access:	Acceder al recurso
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