Strategyproofness-Exposing Descriptions of Matching Mechanisms

Fuente: arXiv
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Autores principales: Gonczarowski, Yannai A., Heffetz, Ori, Thomas, Clayton
Formato: Preprint
Publicado: 2022
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author Gonczarowski, Yannai A.
Heffetz, Ori
Thomas, Clayton
author_facet Gonczarowski, Yannai A.
Heffetz, Ori
Thomas, Clayton
contents A menu description exposes strategyproofness by presenting a mechanism to player $i$ in two steps. Step (1) uses others' reports to describe $i$'s menu of potential outcomes. Step (2) uses $i$'s report to select $i$'s favorite outcome from her menu. We provide novel menu descriptions of the Deferred Acceptance (DA) and Top Trading Cycles (TTC) matching mechanisms. For TTC, our description additionally yields a proof of the strategyproofness of TTC's traditional description, in a way that we prove is impossible for DA.
format Preprint
id arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2209_13148
institution arXiv
publishDate 2022
record_format arxiv
spellingShingle Strategyproofness-Exposing Descriptions of Matching Mechanisms
Gonczarowski, Yannai A.
Heffetz, Ori
Thomas, Clayton
Theoretical Economics
Computational Complexity
Computer Science and Game Theory
A menu description exposes strategyproofness by presenting a mechanism to player $i$ in two steps. Step (1) uses others' reports to describe $i$'s menu of potential outcomes. Step (2) uses $i$'s report to select $i$'s favorite outcome from her menu. We provide novel menu descriptions of the Deferred Acceptance (DA) and Top Trading Cycles (TTC) matching mechanisms. For TTC, our description additionally yields a proof of the strategyproofness of TTC's traditional description, in a way that we prove is impossible for DA.
title Strategyproofness-Exposing Descriptions of Matching Mechanisms
topic Theoretical Economics
Computational Complexity
Computer Science and Game Theory
url https://arxiv.org/abs/2209.13148