DRAG: Distributed Resource Allocation Games over Multiple Interacting Coalitions
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arXiv
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| Auteurs principaux: | , , , , |
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| Format: | Preprint |
| Publié: |
2022
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| _version_ | 1866908552971419648 |
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| author | Zhou, Jialing Wen, Guanghui Lv, Yuezu Yang, Tao Chen, Guanrong |
| author_facet | Zhou, Jialing Wen, Guanghui Lv, Yuezu Yang, Tao Chen, Guanrong |
| contents | Despite many distributed resource allocation (DRA) algorithms have been reported in literature, it is still unknown how to allocate the resource optimally over multiple interacting coalitions. One major challenge in solving such a problem is that, the relevance of the decision on resource allocation in a coalition to the benefit of others may lead to conflicts of interest among these coalitions. Under this context, a new type of multi-coalition game is formulated in this paper, termed as resource allocation game, where each coalition contains multiple agents that cooperate to maximize the coalition-level benefit while subject to the resource constraint described by a coupled equality. Inspired by techniques such as variable replacement, gradient tracking and leader-following consensus, two new kinds of DRA algorithms are developed respectively for the scenarios where the individual benefit of each agent explicitly depends on the states of itself and some agents in other coalitions, and on the states of all the game participants. It is shown that the proposed algorithms can converge linearly to the Nash equilibrium (NE) of the multi-coalition game while satisfying the resource constraint during the whole NE-seeking process. Finally, the validity of the present allocation algorithms is verified by numerical simulations. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2210_02919 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2022 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | DRAG: Distributed Resource Allocation Games over Multiple Interacting Coalitions Zhou, Jialing Wen, Guanghui Lv, Yuezu Yang, Tao Chen, Guanrong Optimization and Control Despite many distributed resource allocation (DRA) algorithms have been reported in literature, it is still unknown how to allocate the resource optimally over multiple interacting coalitions. One major challenge in solving such a problem is that, the relevance of the decision on resource allocation in a coalition to the benefit of others may lead to conflicts of interest among these coalitions. Under this context, a new type of multi-coalition game is formulated in this paper, termed as resource allocation game, where each coalition contains multiple agents that cooperate to maximize the coalition-level benefit while subject to the resource constraint described by a coupled equality. Inspired by techniques such as variable replacement, gradient tracking and leader-following consensus, two new kinds of DRA algorithms are developed respectively for the scenarios where the individual benefit of each agent explicitly depends on the states of itself and some agents in other coalitions, and on the states of all the game participants. It is shown that the proposed algorithms can converge linearly to the Nash equilibrium (NE) of the multi-coalition game while satisfying the resource constraint during the whole NE-seeking process. Finally, the validity of the present allocation algorithms is verified by numerical simulations. |
| title | DRAG: Distributed Resource Allocation Games over Multiple Interacting Coalitions |
| topic | Optimization and Control |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2210.02919 |