EvilScreen Attack: Smart TV Hijacking via Multi-channel Remote Control Mimicry
Fuente:
arXiv
Gespeichert in:
| Hauptverfasser: | , , , , , |
|---|---|
| Format: | Preprint |
| Veröffentlicht: |
2022
|
| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | |
| Tags: |
Tag hinzufügen
Keine Tags, Fügen Sie den ersten Tag hinzu!
|
| _version_ | 1866917801444245504 |
|---|---|
| author | Zhang, Yiwei Ma, Siqi Chen, Tiancheng Li, Juanru Deng, Robert H. Bertino, Elisa |
| author_facet | Zhang, Yiwei Ma, Siqi Chen, Tiancheng Li, Juanru Deng, Robert H. Bertino, Elisa |
| contents | Modern smart TVs often communicate with their remote controls (including those smart phone simulated ones) using multiple wireless channels (e.g., Infrared, Bluetooth, and Wi-Fi). However, this multi-channel remote control communication introduces a new attack surface. An inherent security flaw is that remote controls of most smart TVs are designed to work in a benign environment rather than an adversarial one, and thus wireless communications between a smart TV and its remote controls are not strongly protected. Attackers could leverage such flaw to abuse the remote control communication and compromise smart TV systems. In this paper, we propose EvilScreen, a novel attack that exploits ill-protected remote control communications to access protected resources of a smart TV or even control the screen. EvilScreen exploits a multi-channel remote control mimicry vulnerability present in today smart TVs. Unlike other attacks, which compromise the TV system by exploiting code vulnerabilities or malicious third-party apps, EvilScreen directly reuses commands of different remote controls, combines them together to circumvent deployed authentication and isolation policies, and finally accesses or controls TV resources remotely. We evaluated eight mainstream smart TVs and found that they are all vulnerable to EvilScreen attacks, including a Samsung product adopting the ISO/IEC security specification. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2210_03014 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2022 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | EvilScreen Attack: Smart TV Hijacking via Multi-channel Remote Control Mimicry Zhang, Yiwei Ma, Siqi Chen, Tiancheng Li, Juanru Deng, Robert H. Bertino, Elisa Cryptography and Security Modern smart TVs often communicate with their remote controls (including those smart phone simulated ones) using multiple wireless channels (e.g., Infrared, Bluetooth, and Wi-Fi). However, this multi-channel remote control communication introduces a new attack surface. An inherent security flaw is that remote controls of most smart TVs are designed to work in a benign environment rather than an adversarial one, and thus wireless communications between a smart TV and its remote controls are not strongly protected. Attackers could leverage such flaw to abuse the remote control communication and compromise smart TV systems. In this paper, we propose EvilScreen, a novel attack that exploits ill-protected remote control communications to access protected resources of a smart TV or even control the screen. EvilScreen exploits a multi-channel remote control mimicry vulnerability present in today smart TVs. Unlike other attacks, which compromise the TV system by exploiting code vulnerabilities or malicious third-party apps, EvilScreen directly reuses commands of different remote controls, combines them together to circumvent deployed authentication and isolation policies, and finally accesses or controls TV resources remotely. We evaluated eight mainstream smart TVs and found that they are all vulnerable to EvilScreen attacks, including a Samsung product adopting the ISO/IEC security specification. |
| title | EvilScreen Attack: Smart TV Hijacking via Multi-channel Remote Control Mimicry |
| topic | Cryptography and Security |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2210.03014 |