Making Information More Valuable
Fuente:
arXiv
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| Format: | Preprint |
| Publié: |
2022
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| _version_ | 1866908968152989696 |
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| author | Whitmeyer, Mark |
| author_facet | Whitmeyer, Mark |
| contents | We study what changes to an agent's decision problem increase her value for information. We prove that information becomes more valuable if and only if the agent's reduced-form payoff in her belief becomes more convex. When the transformation corresponds to the addition of an action, the requisite increase in convexity occurs if and only if a simple geometric condition holds, which extends in a natural way to the addition of multiple actions. We apply these findings to two scenarios: a monopolistic screening problem in which the good is information and delegation with information acquisition. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2210_04418 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2022 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Making Information More Valuable Whitmeyer, Mark Theoretical Economics We study what changes to an agent's decision problem increase her value for information. We prove that information becomes more valuable if and only if the agent's reduced-form payoff in her belief becomes more convex. When the transformation corresponds to the addition of an action, the requisite increase in convexity occurs if and only if a simple geometric condition holds, which extends in a natural way to the addition of multiple actions. We apply these findings to two scenarios: a monopolistic screening problem in which the good is information and delegation with information acquisition. |
| title | Making Information More Valuable |
| topic | Theoretical Economics |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2210.04418 |