Discrete & Bayesian Transaction Fee Mechanisms

Fuente: arXiv
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Main Authors: Gafni, Yotam, Yaish, Aviv
Format: Preprint
Published: 2022
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author Gafni, Yotam
Yaish, Aviv
author_facet Gafni, Yotam
Yaish, Aviv
contents Cryptocurrencies employ auction-esque transaction fee mechanisms (TFMs) to allocate transactions to blocks, and to determine how much fees miners can collect from transactions. Several impossibility results show that TFMs that satisfy a standard set of "good" properties obtain low revenue, and in certain cases, no revenue at all. In this work, we circumvent previous impossibilities by showing that when desired TFM properties are reasonably relaxed, simple mechanisms can obtain strictly positive revenue. By discretizing fees, we design a TFM that satisfies the extended TFM desiderata: it is dominant strategy incentive-compatible (DSIC), myopic miner incentive-compatible (MMIC), side-contract-proof (SCP) and obtains asymptotically optimal revenue (i.e., linear in the number of allocated bids), and optimal revenue when considering separable TFMs. If instead of discretizing fees we relax the DSIC and SCP properties, we show that Bitcoin's TFM, after applying the revelation principle, is Bayesian incentive-compatible (BIC), MMIC, off-chain-agreement (OCA) proof, and approximately revenue-optimal. We reach our results by characterizing the class of multi-item OCA-proof mechanisms, which may be of independent interest.
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id arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2210_07793
institution arXiv
publishDate 2022
record_format arxiv
spellingShingle Discrete & Bayesian Transaction Fee Mechanisms
Gafni, Yotam
Yaish, Aviv
Computer Science and Game Theory
Theoretical Economics
Cryptocurrencies employ auction-esque transaction fee mechanisms (TFMs) to allocate transactions to blocks, and to determine how much fees miners can collect from transactions. Several impossibility results show that TFMs that satisfy a standard set of "good" properties obtain low revenue, and in certain cases, no revenue at all. In this work, we circumvent previous impossibilities by showing that when desired TFM properties are reasonably relaxed, simple mechanisms can obtain strictly positive revenue. By discretizing fees, we design a TFM that satisfies the extended TFM desiderata: it is dominant strategy incentive-compatible (DSIC), myopic miner incentive-compatible (MMIC), side-contract-proof (SCP) and obtains asymptotically optimal revenue (i.e., linear in the number of allocated bids), and optimal revenue when considering separable TFMs. If instead of discretizing fees we relax the DSIC and SCP properties, we show that Bitcoin's TFM, after applying the revelation principle, is Bayesian incentive-compatible (BIC), MMIC, off-chain-agreement (OCA) proof, and approximately revenue-optimal. We reach our results by characterizing the class of multi-item OCA-proof mechanisms, which may be of independent interest.
title Discrete & Bayesian Transaction Fee Mechanisms
topic Computer Science and Game Theory
Theoretical Economics
url https://arxiv.org/abs/2210.07793