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Discrete & Bayesian Transaction Fee Mechanisms

Fuente: arXiv

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors:	Gafni, Yotam, Yaish, Aviv
Format:	Preprint
Published:	2022
Subjects:	Computer Science and Game Theory Theoretical Economics
Online Access:	Acceder al recurso
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