Weighted simple games and the topology of simplicial complexes

Fuente: arXiv
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Auteurs principaux: Brooks, Anastasia, Sarcevic, Franjo, Volic, Ismar
Format: Preprint
Publié: 2022
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author Brooks, Anastasia
Sarcevic, Franjo
Volic, Ismar
author_facet Brooks, Anastasia
Sarcevic, Franjo
Volic, Ismar
contents We use simplicial complexes to model simple games as well as weighted voting games where certain coalitions are considered impossible. Topological characterizations of various ideas from simple games are provided, as are the expressions for Banzhaf and Shapley-Shubik power indices for weighted games. We calculate the indices in several examples of weighted voting games with unfeasible coalitions, including the U.S. Electoral College and the Parliament of Bosnia-Herzegovina.
format Preprint
id arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2210_09771
institution arXiv
publishDate 2022
record_format arxiv
spellingShingle Weighted simple games and the topology of simplicial complexes
Brooks, Anastasia
Sarcevic, Franjo
Volic, Ismar
Physics and Society
Combinatorics
91F10, 91B12, 05E45
We use simplicial complexes to model simple games as well as weighted voting games where certain coalitions are considered impossible. Topological characterizations of various ideas from simple games are provided, as are the expressions for Banzhaf and Shapley-Shubik power indices for weighted games. We calculate the indices in several examples of weighted voting games with unfeasible coalitions, including the U.S. Electoral College and the Parliament of Bosnia-Herzegovina.
title Weighted simple games and the topology of simplicial complexes
topic Physics and Society
Combinatorics
91F10, 91B12, 05E45
url https://arxiv.org/abs/2210.09771