Public Good Provision with a Governor
Fuente:
arXiv
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| Autori principali: | , , |
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| Natura: | Preprint |
| Pubblicazione: |
2022
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| _version_ | 1866918390588768256 |
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| author | Anwar, Chowdhury Mohammad Sakib Matros, Alexander SenGupta, Sonali |
| author_facet | Anwar, Chowdhury Mohammad Sakib Matros, Alexander SenGupta, Sonali |
| contents | We study a public good game with N citizens and a Governor who allocates resources from a common fund. Citizens may voluntarily contribute or be compelled to do so if audited, in which case shirkers face a penalty. The Governor decides how much of the fund to devote to public good provision, with the remainder embezzled. Crucially, the Governor's utility combines material payoffs from embezzlement with belief-dependent reputational concerns. We fully characterize the symmetric subgame perfect equilibria (SSPE) of the game. The model always admits at least one pure-strategy equilibrium, ranging from universal free-riding with complete embezzlement to full contribution with efficient provision. Mixed-strategy equilibria exist only in a narrow region of parameter values and may involve multiple equilibria. Our analysis highlights the roles of penalties, audits, and reputational incentives in sustaining contribution and provision, thereby linking public good provision with the broader literature on corruption, embezzlement, and psychological game theory. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2210_10642 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2022 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Public Good Provision with a Governor Anwar, Chowdhury Mohammad Sakib Matros, Alexander SenGupta, Sonali Theoretical Economics We study a public good game with N citizens and a Governor who allocates resources from a common fund. Citizens may voluntarily contribute or be compelled to do so if audited, in which case shirkers face a penalty. The Governor decides how much of the fund to devote to public good provision, with the remainder embezzled. Crucially, the Governor's utility combines material payoffs from embezzlement with belief-dependent reputational concerns. We fully characterize the symmetric subgame perfect equilibria (SSPE) of the game. The model always admits at least one pure-strategy equilibrium, ranging from universal free-riding with complete embezzlement to full contribution with efficient provision. Mixed-strategy equilibria exist only in a narrow region of parameter values and may involve multiple equilibria. Our analysis highlights the roles of penalties, audits, and reputational incentives in sustaining contribution and provision, thereby linking public good provision with the broader literature on corruption, embezzlement, and psychological game theory. |
| title | Public Good Provision with a Governor |
| topic | Theoretical Economics |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2210.10642 |