Approximating Nash Social Welfare by Matching and Local Search

Fuente: arXiv
Salvato in:
Dettagli Bibliografici
Autori principali: Garg, Jugal, Husić, Edin, Li, Wenzheng, Végh, László A., Vondrák, Jan
Natura: Preprint
Pubblicazione: 2022
Soggetti:
Accesso online:
Tags: Aggiungi Tag
Nessun Tag, puoi essere il primo ad aggiungerne!!
_version_ 1866912985368231936
author Garg, Jugal
Husić, Edin
Li, Wenzheng
Végh, László A.
Vondrák, Jan
author_facet Garg, Jugal
Husić, Edin
Li, Wenzheng
Végh, László A.
Vondrák, Jan
contents For any $\varepsilon>0$, we give a simple, deterministic $(4+\varepsilon)$-approximation algorithm for the Nash social welfare (NSW) problem under submodular valuations. We also consider the asymmetric variant of the problem, where the objective is to maximize the weighted geometric mean of agents' valuations, and give an $e (ω+ 2 + \varepsilon)$-approximation if the ratio between the largest weight and the average weight is at most $ω$. We also show that the $1/2$-EFX envy-freeness property can be attained simultaneously with a constant-factor approximation. More precisely, we can find an allocation in polynomial time that is both $1/2$-EFX and a $(8+\varepsilon)$-approximation to the symmetric NSW problem under submodular valuations.
format Preprint
id arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2211_03883
institution arXiv
publishDate 2022
record_format arxiv
spellingShingle Approximating Nash Social Welfare by Matching and Local Search
Garg, Jugal
Husić, Edin
Li, Wenzheng
Végh, László A.
Vondrák, Jan
Computer Science and Game Theory
Data Structures and Algorithms
For any $\varepsilon>0$, we give a simple, deterministic $(4+\varepsilon)$-approximation algorithm for the Nash social welfare (NSW) problem under submodular valuations. We also consider the asymmetric variant of the problem, where the objective is to maximize the weighted geometric mean of agents' valuations, and give an $e (ω+ 2 + \varepsilon)$-approximation if the ratio between the largest weight and the average weight is at most $ω$. We also show that the $1/2$-EFX envy-freeness property can be attained simultaneously with a constant-factor approximation. More precisely, we can find an allocation in polynomial time that is both $1/2$-EFX and a $(8+\varepsilon)$-approximation to the symmetric NSW problem under submodular valuations.
title Approximating Nash Social Welfare by Matching and Local Search
topic Computer Science and Game Theory
Data Structures and Algorithms
url https://arxiv.org/abs/2211.03883