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Multi-Agent Contracts

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors:	Duetting, Paul, Ezra, Tomer, Feldman, Michal, Kesselheim, Thomas
Format:	Preprint
Published:	2022
Subjects:	Computer Science and Game Theory
Online Access:	Acceder al recurso
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