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Approximate Optimality of Linear Contracts Under Uncertainty

Fuente: arXiv

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Autores principales:	Alon, Tal, Dütting, Paul, Li, Yingkai, Talgam-Cohen, Inbal
Formato:	Preprint
Publicado:	2022
Materias:	Computer Science and Game Theory Theoretical Economics
Acceso en línea:	Acceder al recurso
Etiquetas:	Agregar Etiqueta Sin Etiquetas, Sea el primero en etiquetar este registro!

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