Efficient Communication in Organizations

Fuente: arXiv
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Autore principale: Vaccari, Federico
Natura: Preprint
Pubblicazione: 2022
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author Vaccari, Federico
author_facet Vaccari, Federico
contents This paper studies the organization of communication between biased senders and a receiver. Senders can misreport their private information at a cost. Efficiency is achieved by clearing information asymmetries without incurring costs. Results show that only one communication protocol is efficient, robust to collusion, and free from unnecessary complexities. This protocol has a simple, adversarial, and public structure. It always induces efficient equilibria, for which a closed-form characterization is provided. The findings are relevant for the design of organizations that seek to improve decision-making while limiting wasteful influence activities.
format Preprint
id arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2211_13605
institution arXiv
publishDate 2022
record_format arxiv
spellingShingle Efficient Communication in Organizations
Vaccari, Federico
Theoretical Economics
This paper studies the organization of communication between biased senders and a receiver. Senders can misreport their private information at a cost. Efficiency is achieved by clearing information asymmetries without incurring costs. Results show that only one communication protocol is efficient, robust to collusion, and free from unnecessary complexities. This protocol has a simple, adversarial, and public structure. It always induces efficient equilibria, for which a closed-form characterization is provided. The findings are relevant for the design of organizations that seek to improve decision-making while limiting wasteful influence activities.
title Efficient Communication in Organizations
topic Theoretical Economics
url https://arxiv.org/abs/2211.13605