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| Format: | Preprint |
| Veröffentlicht: |
2022
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| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | https://arxiv.org/abs/2211.13605 |
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| _version_ | 1866913673407102976 |
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| author | Vaccari, Federico |
| author_facet | Vaccari, Federico |
| contents | This paper studies the organization of communication between biased senders and a receiver. Senders can misreport their private information at a cost. Efficiency is achieved by clearing information asymmetries without incurring costs. Results show that only one communication protocol is efficient, robust to collusion, and free from unnecessary complexities. This protocol has a simple, adversarial, and public structure. It always induces efficient equilibria, for which a closed-form characterization is provided. The findings are relevant for the design of organizations that seek to improve decision-making while limiting wasteful influence activities. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2211_13605 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2022 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Efficient Communication in Organizations Vaccari, Federico Theoretical Economics This paper studies the organization of communication between biased senders and a receiver. Senders can misreport their private information at a cost. Efficiency is achieved by clearing information asymmetries without incurring costs. Results show that only one communication protocol is efficient, robust to collusion, and free from unnecessary complexities. This protocol has a simple, adversarial, and public structure. It always induces efficient equilibria, for which a closed-form characterization is provided. The findings are relevant for the design of organizations that seek to improve decision-making while limiting wasteful influence activities. |
| title | Efficient Communication in Organizations |
| topic | Theoretical Economics |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2211.13605 |