Mechanism Design With Predictions for Obnoxious Facility Location

Fuente: arXiv
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Main Authors: Istrate, Gabriel, Bonchis, Cosmin
Format: Preprint
Published: 2022
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author Istrate, Gabriel
Bonchis, Cosmin
author_facet Istrate, Gabriel
Bonchis, Cosmin
contents We study mechanism design with predictions for the obnoxious facility location problem. We present deterministic strategyproof mechanisms that display tradeoffs between robustness and consistency on segments, squares, circles and trees. All these mechanisms are actually group strategyproof, with the exception of the case of squares, where manipulations from coalitions of two agents exist. We prove that these tradeoffs are optimal in the 1-dimensional case.
format Preprint
id arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2212_09521
institution arXiv
publishDate 2022
record_format arxiv
spellingShingle Mechanism Design With Predictions for Obnoxious Facility Location
Istrate, Gabriel
Bonchis, Cosmin
Computer Science and Game Theory
Artificial Intelligence
Multiagent Systems
We study mechanism design with predictions for the obnoxious facility location problem. We present deterministic strategyproof mechanisms that display tradeoffs between robustness and consistency on segments, squares, circles and trees. All these mechanisms are actually group strategyproof, with the exception of the case of squares, where manipulations from coalitions of two agents exist. We prove that these tradeoffs are optimal in the 1-dimensional case.
title Mechanism Design With Predictions for Obnoxious Facility Location
topic Computer Science and Game Theory
Artificial Intelligence
Multiagent Systems
url https://arxiv.org/abs/2212.09521