On the Complexity of the Two-Stage Majoritarian Rule

Fuente: arXiv
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Autor principal: Yang, Yongjie
Formato: Preprint
Publicado: 2023
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author Yang, Yongjie
author_facet Yang, Yongjie
contents Sequential voting rules have played a crucial role in shaping decisions within parliamentary and legislative frameworks. After observing that the existing sequential rules fail several fundamental axioms, Horan and Sprumont [2022] proposed a sequential rule named two-stage majoritarian rule (TSMR). This paper examines this rule by investigating the complexity of {\sc{Agenda Control}}, {\sc{Coalition Manipulation}}, {\sc{Possible Winner}}, {\sc{Necessary Winner}}, and eight standard election control problems. Our study offers a comprehensive insight into the complexity landscape of these problems.
format Preprint
id arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2301_04009
institution arXiv
publishDate 2023
record_format arxiv
spellingShingle On the Complexity of the Two-Stage Majoritarian Rule
Yang, Yongjie
Computer Science and Game Theory
Data Structures and Algorithms
Sequential voting rules have played a crucial role in shaping decisions within parliamentary and legislative frameworks. After observing that the existing sequential rules fail several fundamental axioms, Horan and Sprumont [2022] proposed a sequential rule named two-stage majoritarian rule (TSMR). This paper examines this rule by investigating the complexity of {\sc{Agenda Control}}, {\sc{Coalition Manipulation}}, {\sc{Possible Winner}}, {\sc{Necessary Winner}}, and eight standard election control problems. Our study offers a comprehensive insight into the complexity landscape of these problems.
title On the Complexity of the Two-Stage Majoritarian Rule
topic Computer Science and Game Theory
Data Structures and Algorithms
url https://arxiv.org/abs/2301.04009