Ozawa's Intersubjectivity Theorem as objection to QBism individual agent perspective

Fuente: arXiv
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Main Author: Khrennikov, Andrei
Format: Preprint
Published: 2023
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author Khrennikov, Andrei
author_facet Khrennikov, Andrei
contents QBism's foundational statement that ``the outcome of a measurement of an observable is personal'' is in the straight contraversion with Ozawa's Intersubjectivity Theorem (OIT). The latter (proven within the quantum formalism) states that two observers, agents within the QBism terminology, performing joint measurements of the same observable $A$ on a system $S$ in the state $ψ$ should get the same outcome $A=x.$ In Ozawa's terminology, this outcome is intersubjective and it can't be treated as personal. This is the strong objection to QBism which can't survive without updating its principles. The essential aspect in understanding of the OIT-impact on QBism's foundations takes the notion of quantum observable. This paper comprises the complementary discussion highlighting the difference between the accurate, von Neumann, and inaccurate, noisy, quantum observables which are represented by PVMs and POVMs respectively. Moreover, we discuss the OIT-impact on the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics.
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id arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2301_04014
institution arXiv
publishDate 2023
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spellingShingle Ozawa's Intersubjectivity Theorem as objection to QBism individual agent perspective
Khrennikov, Andrei
Quantum Physics
QBism's foundational statement that ``the outcome of a measurement of an observable is personal'' is in the straight contraversion with Ozawa's Intersubjectivity Theorem (OIT). The latter (proven within the quantum formalism) states that two observers, agents within the QBism terminology, performing joint measurements of the same observable $A$ on a system $S$ in the state $ψ$ should get the same outcome $A=x.$ In Ozawa's terminology, this outcome is intersubjective and it can't be treated as personal. This is the strong objection to QBism which can't survive without updating its principles. The essential aspect in understanding of the OIT-impact on QBism's foundations takes the notion of quantum observable. This paper comprises the complementary discussion highlighting the difference between the accurate, von Neumann, and inaccurate, noisy, quantum observables which are represented by PVMs and POVMs respectively. Moreover, we discuss the OIT-impact on the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics.
title Ozawa's Intersubjectivity Theorem as objection to QBism individual agent perspective
topic Quantum Physics
url https://arxiv.org/abs/2301.04014