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Combinatorial Pen Testing (or Consumer Surplus of Deferred-Acceptance Auctions)

Fuente: arXiv

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Autores principales:	Ganesh, Aadityan, Hartline, Jason
Formato:	Preprint
Publicado:	2023
Materias:	Computer Science and Game Theory Data Structures and Algorithms Theoretical Economics
Acceso en línea:	Acceder al recurso
Etiquetas:	Agregar Etiqueta Sin Etiquetas, Sea el primero en etiquetar este registro!

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