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Credible, Optimal Auctions via Public Broadcast

Fuente: arXiv

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors:	Chitra, Tarun, Ferreira, Matheus V. X., Kulkarni, Kshitij
Format:	Preprint
Published:	2023
Subjects:	Computer Science and Game Theory Cryptography and Security
Online Access:	Acceder al recurso
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