Approximating the Shapley Value without Marginal Contributions

Fuente: arXiv
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Autores principales: Kolpaczki, Patrick, Bengs, Viktor, Muschalik, Maximilian, Hüllermeier, Eyke
Formato: Preprint
Publicado: 2023
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author Kolpaczki, Patrick
Bengs, Viktor
Muschalik, Maximilian
Hüllermeier, Eyke
author_facet Kolpaczki, Patrick
Bengs, Viktor
Muschalik, Maximilian
Hüllermeier, Eyke
contents The Shapley value, which is arguably the most popular approach for assigning a meaningful contribution value to players in a cooperative game, has recently been used intensively in explainable artificial intelligence. Its meaningfulness is due to axiomatic properties that only the Shapley value satisfies, which, however, comes at the expense of an exact computation growing exponentially with the number of agents. Accordingly, a number of works are devoted to the efficient approximation of the Shapley value, most of them revolve around the notion of an agent's marginal contribution. In this paper, we propose with SVARM and Stratified SVARM two parameter-free and domain-independent approximation algorithms based on a representation of the Shapley value detached from the notion of marginal contribution. We prove unmatched theoretical guarantees regarding their approximation quality and provide empirical results including synthetic games as well as common explainability use cases comparing ourselves with state-of-the-art methods.
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id arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2302_00736
institution arXiv
publishDate 2023
record_format arxiv
spellingShingle Approximating the Shapley Value without Marginal Contributions
Kolpaczki, Patrick
Bengs, Viktor
Muschalik, Maximilian
Hüllermeier, Eyke
Machine Learning
Computer Science and Game Theory
The Shapley value, which is arguably the most popular approach for assigning a meaningful contribution value to players in a cooperative game, has recently been used intensively in explainable artificial intelligence. Its meaningfulness is due to axiomatic properties that only the Shapley value satisfies, which, however, comes at the expense of an exact computation growing exponentially with the number of agents. Accordingly, a number of works are devoted to the efficient approximation of the Shapley value, most of them revolve around the notion of an agent's marginal contribution. In this paper, we propose with SVARM and Stratified SVARM two parameter-free and domain-independent approximation algorithms based on a representation of the Shapley value detached from the notion of marginal contribution. We prove unmatched theoretical guarantees regarding their approximation quality and provide empirical results including synthetic games as well as common explainability use cases comparing ourselves with state-of-the-art methods.
title Approximating the Shapley Value without Marginal Contributions
topic Machine Learning
Computer Science and Game Theory
url https://arxiv.org/abs/2302.00736