A Robust Multi-Item Auction Design with Statistical Learning
Fuente:
arXiv
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| Autores principales: | , |
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| Formato: | Preprint |
| Publicado: |
2023
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| _version_ | 1866910044173369344 |
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| author | Han, Jiale Dai, Xiaowu |
| author_facet | Han, Jiale Dai, Xiaowu |
| contents | We propose a novel statistical learning method for multi-item auctions that incorporates credible intervals. Our approach employs nonparametric density estimation to estimate credible intervals for bidder types based on historical data. We introduce two new strategies that leverage these credible intervals to reduce the time cost of implementing auctions. The first strategy screens potential winners' value regions within the credible intervals, while the second strategy simplifies the type distribution when the length of the interval is below a threshold value. These strategies are easy to implement and ensure fairness, dominant-strategy incentive compatibility, and dominant-strategy individual rationality with a high probability, while simultaneously reducing implementation costs. We demonstrate the effectiveness of our strategies using the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism and evaluate their performance through simulation experiments. Our results show that the proposed strategies consistently outperform alternative methods, achieving both revenue maximization and cost reduction objectives. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2302_00941 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2023 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | A Robust Multi-Item Auction Design with Statistical Learning Han, Jiale Dai, Xiaowu Computer Science and Game Theory Machine Learning We propose a novel statistical learning method for multi-item auctions that incorporates credible intervals. Our approach employs nonparametric density estimation to estimate credible intervals for bidder types based on historical data. We introduce two new strategies that leverage these credible intervals to reduce the time cost of implementing auctions. The first strategy screens potential winners' value regions within the credible intervals, while the second strategy simplifies the type distribution when the length of the interval is below a threshold value. These strategies are easy to implement and ensure fairness, dominant-strategy incentive compatibility, and dominant-strategy individual rationality with a high probability, while simultaneously reducing implementation costs. We demonstrate the effectiveness of our strategies using the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism and evaluate their performance through simulation experiments. Our results show that the proposed strategies consistently outperform alternative methods, achieving both revenue maximization and cost reduction objectives. |
| title | A Robust Multi-Item Auction Design with Statistical Learning |
| topic | Computer Science and Game Theory Machine Learning |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2302.00941 |