Image de couverture de livre

Polyhedral Clinching Auctions with a Single Sample

Fuente: arXiv

Enregistré dans:

Détails bibliographiques
Auteur principal:	Sato, Ryosuke
Format:	Preprint
Publié:	2023
Sujets:	Computer Science and Game Theory 91B26
Accès en ligne:	Acceder al recurso
Tags:	Ajouter un tag Pas de tags, Soyez le premier à ajouter un tag!

Documents similaires

Polyhedral Clinching Auctions for Indivisible Goods
par: Hirai, Hiroshi, et autres
Publié: (2023)

Liquid Welfare and Revenue Monotonicity in Adaptive Clinching Auctions
par: Sato, Ryosuke
Publié: (2025)

Ascending Auctions for Combinatorial Markets with Frictions: A Unified Framework via Discrete Convex Analysis
par: Oki, Taihei, et autres
Publié: (2026)

Beyond Advertising: Mechanism Design for Platform-Wide Marketing Service "QuanZhanTui"
par: Li, Ningyuan, et autres
Publié: (2025)

The Simplicity of Optimal Dynamic Mechanisms
par: Correa, Jose, et autres
Publié: (2024)

Prices, Bids, Values: One ML-Powered Combinatorial Auction to Rule Them All
par: Soumalias, Ermis, et autres
Publié: (2024)

Bloc Voting on Single Peaked Preferences
par: Calver, Ariel, et autres
Publié: (2026)

JD-BP: A Joint-Decision Generative Framework for Auto-Bidding and Pricing
par: Meng, Linghui, et autres
Publié: (2026)

From Swap Axioms to Weighted Geometric Means: A Characterization of AMMs
par: Assmann, Björn, et autres
Publié: (2026)

HOB: A Holistically Optimized Bidding Strategy under Heterogeneous Auction Mechanisms with Organic Traffic
par: Li, Qi, et autres
Publié: (2025)

The Privacy Subsidy in Continuous-Time Kyle: Cumulative Welfare under Noise-Perturbed Order-Flow Observation
par: Nakamura, Yuki
Publié: (2026)

The Privacy Subsidy: Kyle's $λ$ under Noise-Perturbed Order-Flow Observation
par: Nakamura, Yuki
Publié: (2026)

The Privacy Subsidy in Glosten-Milgrom: Bid-Ask Spread and Welfare under Flip-Noise Direction Observation
par: Nakamura, Yuki
Publié: (2026)

MenuNet: A Strategy-Proof Mechanism for Matching Markets
par: Sun, Zhaohong, et autres
Publié: (2026)

A Survey on Bilateral Multi-Round Cloud-SLA Negotiation Strategies
par: Pittl, Benedikt, et autres
Publié: (2025)

Maximin Shares in Hereditary Set Systems
par: Hummel, Halvard
Publié: (2024)

Distances Between Top-Truncated Elections of Different Sizes
par: Faliszewski, Piotr, et autres
Publié: (2026)

Envy-Free and Pareto-Optimal Allocations for Agents with Asymmetric Random Valuations
par: Bai, Yushi, et autres
Publié: (2021)

Markets are competitive if and only if P != NP
par: Maymin, Philip Z.
Publié: (2026)

Efficient Equilibrium Computation in Symmetric First-Price Auctions
par: Filos-Ratsikas, Aris, et autres
Publié: (2026)

Desirability and social rankings
par: Aleandri, Michele, et autres
Publié: (2024)

A new social welfare function with a number of desirable properties
par: Hou, Fujun
Publié: (2024)

EF1 Allocations for Identical Trilean and Separable Single-Peaked Valuations
par: Bhaskar, Umang, et autres
Publié: (2024)

Allocation Proportionality of OWA--Based Committee Scoring Rules
par: Boratyn, Daria, et autres
Publié: (2026)

Non-Borda elections under relaxed IIA conditions
par: Gendler, Gabriel
Publié: (2024)

Disc Game Dynamics: A Latent Space Perspective on Selection and Learning in Games
par: Lechon-Alonso, Pablo, et autres
Publié: (2025)

On the stability of the logit dynamics in population games
par: Cianfanelli, Leonardo, et autres
Publié: (2023)

Multilinear formulations for computing Nash equilibrium of multi-player matrix games
par: Fischer, Miriam, et autres
Publié: (2022)

The Division Problem of Chances
par: Ramezanian, Rasoul
Publié: (2024)

Price Equilibria in a Spatial Competition with Captive Buyers
par: Kawai, Shinnosuke, et autres
Publié: (2025)

Spoiler Susceptibility in Party Elections
par: Boratyn, Daria, et autres
Publié: (2022)

BallotRank: A Condorcet Completion Method for Graphs
par: Todd, Jason Douglas, et autres
Publié: (2026)

Instability and Efficiency of Non-cooperative Games
par: Zhang, Jianfeng
Publié: (2024)

From Optimal Transport to Efficient Mechanisms for the $m$-Capacitated Facilities Location Problem with Bayesian Agent
par: Auricchio, Gennaro, et autres
Publié: (2023)

Introspection Dynamics with Mutation in Additive Games
par: Foster, Harry, et autres
Publié: (2026)

Logit-Q Dynamics for Efficient Learning in Stochastic Teams
par: Donmez, Ahmed Said, et autres
Publié: (2023)

Improved Approximation Ratio for Strategyproof Facility Location on a Cycle
par: Rogowski, Krzysztof, et autres
Publié: (2025)

Uncertainty Quantification of Click and Conversion Estimates for the Autobidding
par: Zhigalskii, Ivan, et autres
Publié: (2026)

On Truthful Mechanisms without Pareto-efficiency: Characterizations and Fairness
par: Babaioff, Moshe, et autres
Publié: (2024)

Analyzing Wage Theft in Day Labor Markets via Principal Agent Models
par: Bailey, James P., et autres
Publié: (2024)