Multiplayer War of Attrition with Asymmetric Private Information
Fuente:
arXiv
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| Natura: | Preprint |
| Pubblicazione: |
2023
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| _version_ | 1866917935995420672 |
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| author | Li, Hongcheng |
| author_facet | Li, Hongcheng |
| contents | This paper studies a war of attrition game in the setting of public good provision that combines three elements: (i) multiple players, (ii) incomplete information, and (iii) ex-ante asymmetry. In the unique equilibrium, asymmetry leads to a stratified behavior pattern where one player provides the public good instantly with a positive probability while each of the other players has a player-specific strict waiting time, before which even his highest type will not provide the good. Comparative statics show that a player with less patience, lower cost of provision, and higher reputation in value (expressed in a form of hazard rate) provides the good type-wise uniformly faster. In large societies, the cost of delay is mainly determined by the highest type of the instant-exit player. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2302_09427 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2023 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Multiplayer War of Attrition with Asymmetric Private Information Li, Hongcheng Theoretical Economics This paper studies a war of attrition game in the setting of public good provision that combines three elements: (i) multiple players, (ii) incomplete information, and (iii) ex-ante asymmetry. In the unique equilibrium, asymmetry leads to a stratified behavior pattern where one player provides the public good instantly with a positive probability while each of the other players has a player-specific strict waiting time, before which even his highest type will not provide the good. Comparative statics show that a player with less patience, lower cost of provision, and higher reputation in value (expressed in a form of hazard rate) provides the good type-wise uniformly faster. In large societies, the cost of delay is mainly determined by the highest type of the instant-exit player. |
| title | Multiplayer War of Attrition with Asymmetric Private Information |
| topic | Theoretical Economics |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2302.09427 |