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Maximizing Miner Revenue in Transaction Fee Mechanism Design

Fuente: arXiv

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors:	Wu, Ke, Shi, Elaine, Chung, Hao
Format:	Preprint
Published:	2023
Subjects:	Computer Science and Game Theory
Online Access:	Acceder al recurso
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