The (Computational) Social Choice Take on Indivisible Participatory Budgeting
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arXiv
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| Autores principales: | , , |
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| Formato: | Preprint |
| Publicado: |
2023
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| _version_ | 1866912273043292160 |
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| author | Rey, Simon Schmidt, Felicia Maly, Jan |
| author_facet | Rey, Simon Schmidt, Felicia Maly, Jan |
| contents | In this survey, we review the literature investigating participatory budgeting as a social choice problem. Participatory Budgeting (PB) is a democratic process in which citizens are asked to vote on how to allocate a given amount of public money to a set of projects. From a social choice perspective, it corresponds then to the problem of aggregating opinions about which projects should be funded, into a budget allocation satisfying a budget constraint. This problem has received substantial attention in recent years and the literature is growing at a fast pace. In this survey, we present the most important research directions from the literature, each time presenting a large set of representative results. We only focus on the indivisible case, that is, PB problems in which projects can either be fully funded or not at all. The aim of the survey is to present a comprehensive overview of the state of the research on PB. We aim at providing both a general overview of the main research questions that are being investigated, and formal and unified definitions of the most important technical concepts from the literature. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2303_00621 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2023 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | The (Computational) Social Choice Take on Indivisible Participatory Budgeting Rey, Simon Schmidt, Felicia Maly, Jan Computer Science and Game Theory Multiagent Systems In this survey, we review the literature investigating participatory budgeting as a social choice problem. Participatory Budgeting (PB) is a democratic process in which citizens are asked to vote on how to allocate a given amount of public money to a set of projects. From a social choice perspective, it corresponds then to the problem of aggregating opinions about which projects should be funded, into a budget allocation satisfying a budget constraint. This problem has received substantial attention in recent years and the literature is growing at a fast pace. In this survey, we present the most important research directions from the literature, each time presenting a large set of representative results. We only focus on the indivisible case, that is, PB problems in which projects can either be fully funded or not at all. The aim of the survey is to present a comprehensive overview of the state of the research on PB. We aim at providing both a general overview of the main research questions that are being investigated, and formal and unified definitions of the most important technical concepts from the literature. |
| title | The (Computational) Social Choice Take on Indivisible Participatory Budgeting |
| topic | Computer Science and Game Theory Multiagent Systems |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2303.00621 |