Probabilistic Game-Theoretic Traffic Routing
Fuente:
arXiv
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| Hauptverfasser: | , |
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| Format: | Preprint |
| Veröffentlicht: |
2023
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| _version_ | 1866913344299991040 |
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| author | Benenati, Emilio Grammatico, Sergio |
| author_facet | Benenati, Emilio Grammatico, Sergio |
| contents | We examine the routing problem for self-interested vehicles using stochastic decision strategies. By approximating the road latency functions and a non-linear variable transformation, we frame the problem as an aggregative game. We characterize the approximation error and we derive a new monotonicity condition for a broad category of games that encompasses the problem under consideration. Next, we propose a semi-decentralized algorithm to calculate the routing as a variational generalized Nash equilibrium and demonstrate the solution's benefits with numerical simulations. In the particular case of potential games, which emerges for linear latency functions, we explore a receding-horizon formulation of the routing problem, showing asymptotic convergence to destinations and analysing closed-loop performance dependence on horizon length through numerical simulations. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2303_03295 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2023 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Probabilistic Game-Theoretic Traffic Routing Benenati, Emilio Grammatico, Sergio Systems and Control Optimization and Control We examine the routing problem for self-interested vehicles using stochastic decision strategies. By approximating the road latency functions and a non-linear variable transformation, we frame the problem as an aggregative game. We characterize the approximation error and we derive a new monotonicity condition for a broad category of games that encompasses the problem under consideration. Next, we propose a semi-decentralized algorithm to calculate the routing as a variational generalized Nash equilibrium and demonstrate the solution's benefits with numerical simulations. In the particular case of potential games, which emerges for linear latency functions, we explore a receding-horizon formulation of the routing problem, showing asymptotic convergence to destinations and analysing closed-loop performance dependence on horizon length through numerical simulations. |
| title | Probabilistic Game-Theoretic Traffic Routing |
| topic | Systems and Control Optimization and Control |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2303.03295 |