Incentives and co-evolution: Steering linear dynamical systems with noncooperative agents
Fuente:
arXiv
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| Autori principali: | , |
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| Natura: | Preprint |
| Pubblicazione: |
2023
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| _version_ | 1866913419753422848 |
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| author | Fabiani, Filippo Simonetto, Andrea |
| author_facet | Fabiani, Filippo Simonetto, Andrea |
| contents | Modern socio-technical systems typically consist of many interconnected users and competing service providers, where notions like market equilibrium are tightly connected to the ``evolution'' of the network of users. In this paper, we model the users' dynamics as a linear dynamical system, and the service providers as agents taking part to a generalized Nash game, whose outcome coincides with the input of the users' dynamics. We thus characterize the notion of co-evolution of the market and the network dynamics and derive dissipativity-based conditions leading to a pertinent notion of equilibrium. We then focus on the control design and adopt the light-touch policy to incentivize or penalize the service providers as little as possible, while steering the networked system to a desirable outcome. We also provide a dimensionality-reduction procedure, which offers network-size independent conditions. Finally, we illustrate our novel notions and algorithms on a simulation setup stemming from digital market regulations for influencers, a topic of growing interest. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2303_07241 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2023 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Incentives and co-evolution: Steering linear dynamical systems with noncooperative agents Fabiani, Filippo Simonetto, Andrea Systems and Control Optimization and Control Modern socio-technical systems typically consist of many interconnected users and competing service providers, where notions like market equilibrium are tightly connected to the ``evolution'' of the network of users. In this paper, we model the users' dynamics as a linear dynamical system, and the service providers as agents taking part to a generalized Nash game, whose outcome coincides with the input of the users' dynamics. We thus characterize the notion of co-evolution of the market and the network dynamics and derive dissipativity-based conditions leading to a pertinent notion of equilibrium. We then focus on the control design and adopt the light-touch policy to incentivize or penalize the service providers as little as possible, while steering the networked system to a desirable outcome. We also provide a dimensionality-reduction procedure, which offers network-size independent conditions. Finally, we illustrate our novel notions and algorithms on a simulation setup stemming from digital market regulations for influencers, a topic of growing interest. |
| title | Incentives and co-evolution: Steering linear dynamical systems with noncooperative agents |
| topic | Systems and Control Optimization and Control |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2303.07241 |