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| Main Authors: | , , , |
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| Format: | Preprint |
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2023
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| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | https://arxiv.org/abs/2303.09850 |
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| _version_ | 1866917604084416512 |
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| author | Cortes-Goicoechea, Mikel Mohandas-Daryanani, Tarun Muñoz-Tapia, Jose Luis Bautista-Gomez, Leonardo |
| author_facet | Cortes-Goicoechea, Mikel Mohandas-Daryanani, Tarun Muñoz-Tapia, Jose Luis Bautista-Gomez, Leonardo |
| contents | Like most modern blockchain networks, Ethereum has relied on economic incentives to promote honest participation in the chain's consensus. The distributed character of the platform, together with the "randomness" or "luck" factor that both proof of work (PoW) and proof of stake (PoS) provide when electing the next block proposer, pushed the industry to model and improve the reward system of the system. With several improvements to predict PoW block proposal rewards and to maximize the extractable rewards of the same ones, the ultimate Ethereum's transition to PoS applied in the Paris Hard-Fork, more generally known as "The Merge", has meant a significant modification on the reward system in the platform. In this paper, we aim to break down both theoretically and empirically the new reward system in this post-merge era. We present a highly detailed description of the different rewards and their share among validators' rewards. Ultimately, we offer a study that uses the presented reward model to analyze the performance of the network during this transition. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2303_09850 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2023 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Autopsy of Ethereum's Post-Merge Reward System Cortes-Goicoechea, Mikel Mohandas-Daryanani, Tarun Muñoz-Tapia, Jose Luis Bautista-Gomez, Leonardo Cryptography and Security Computer Science and Game Theory Like most modern blockchain networks, Ethereum has relied on economic incentives to promote honest participation in the chain's consensus. The distributed character of the platform, together with the "randomness" or "luck" factor that both proof of work (PoW) and proof of stake (PoS) provide when electing the next block proposer, pushed the industry to model and improve the reward system of the system. With several improvements to predict PoW block proposal rewards and to maximize the extractable rewards of the same ones, the ultimate Ethereum's transition to PoS applied in the Paris Hard-Fork, more generally known as "The Merge", has meant a significant modification on the reward system in the platform. In this paper, we aim to break down both theoretically and empirically the new reward system in this post-merge era. We present a highly detailed description of the different rewards and their share among validators' rewards. Ultimately, we offer a study that uses the presented reward model to analyze the performance of the network during this transition. |
| title | Autopsy of Ethereum's Post-Merge Reward System |
| topic | Cryptography and Security Computer Science and Game Theory |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2303.09850 |