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| Main Authors: | , , |
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| Format: | Preprint |
| Published: |
2023
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| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | https://arxiv.org/abs/2303.11522 |
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| _version_ | 1866909649361436672 |
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| author | Jalota, Devansh Sun, Haoyuan Azizan, Navid |
| author_facet | Jalota, Devansh Sun, Haoyuan Azizan, Navid |
| contents | The computation of equilibrium prices at which the supply of goods matches their demand typically relies on complete information on agents' private attributes, e.g., suppliers' cost functions, which are often unavailable in practice. Motivated by this practical consideration, we consider the problem of learning equilibrium prices over a horizon of $T$ periods in the incomplete information setting wherein a market operator seeks to satisfy the customer demand for a commodity by purchasing it from competing suppliers with cost functions unknown to the operator. We first consider the setting when suppliers' cost functions are fixed and develop algorithms that, on three pertinent regret metrics, simultaneously achieve a regret of $O(1)$ when the customer demand is constant over time, and $O(\sqrt{T})$ when the demand varies over time. In the setting when the suppliers' cost functions vary over time, we demonstrate that, in general, no online algorithm can achieve sublinear regret on all three metrics. Thus, we consider an augmented setting wherein the operator has access to hints/contexts that reflect the variation in the cost functions and propose an algorithm with sublinear regret in this augmented setting. Finally, we present numerical experiments that validate our results and discuss various model extensions. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2303_11522 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2023 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Online Learning for Equilibrium Pricing in Markets under Incomplete Information Jalota, Devansh Sun, Haoyuan Azizan, Navid Computer Science and Game Theory Machine Learning The computation of equilibrium prices at which the supply of goods matches their demand typically relies on complete information on agents' private attributes, e.g., suppliers' cost functions, which are often unavailable in practice. Motivated by this practical consideration, we consider the problem of learning equilibrium prices over a horizon of $T$ periods in the incomplete information setting wherein a market operator seeks to satisfy the customer demand for a commodity by purchasing it from competing suppliers with cost functions unknown to the operator. We first consider the setting when suppliers' cost functions are fixed and develop algorithms that, on three pertinent regret metrics, simultaneously achieve a regret of $O(1)$ when the customer demand is constant over time, and $O(\sqrt{T})$ when the demand varies over time. In the setting when the suppliers' cost functions vary over time, we demonstrate that, in general, no online algorithm can achieve sublinear regret on all three metrics. Thus, we consider an augmented setting wherein the operator has access to hints/contexts that reflect the variation in the cost functions and propose an algorithm with sublinear regret in this augmented setting. Finally, we present numerical experiments that validate our results and discuss various model extensions. |
| title | Online Learning for Equilibrium Pricing in Markets under Incomplete Information |
| topic | Computer Science and Game Theory Machine Learning |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2303.11522 |