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Non-Market Allocation Mechanisms: Optimal Design and Investment Incentives

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors:	Augias, Victor, Perez-Richet, Eduardo
Format:	Preprint
Published:	2023
Subjects:	Theoretical Economics
Online Access:	Acceder al recurso
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