Externalities in Chore Division
Fuente:
arXiv
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| Format: | Preprint |
| Published: |
2023
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| _version_ | 1866917596330196992 |
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| author | Sanpui, Mohammad Azharuddin |
| author_facet | Sanpui, Mohammad Azharuddin |
| contents | The chore division problem simulates the fair division of a heterogeneous, undesirable resource among several agents. In the fair division of chores, each agent only gets the disutility from its own piece. Agents may, however, also be concerned with the pieces given to other agents; these externalities naturally appear in fair division situations. We first demonstrate the generalization of the classical concepts of proportionality and envy-freeness while extending the classical model by taking externalities into account. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2303_12446 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2023 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Externalities in Chore Division Sanpui, Mohammad Azharuddin Computer Science and Game Theory Artificial Intelligence Multiagent Systems The chore division problem simulates the fair division of a heterogeneous, undesirable resource among several agents. In the fair division of chores, each agent only gets the disutility from its own piece. Agents may, however, also be concerned with the pieces given to other agents; these externalities naturally appear in fair division situations. We first demonstrate the generalization of the classical concepts of proportionality and envy-freeness while extending the classical model by taking externalities into account. |
| title | Externalities in Chore Division |
| topic | Computer Science and Game Theory Artificial Intelligence Multiagent Systems |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2303.12446 |