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Main Authors: Hu, Xiaoxiao, Lei, Haoran
Format: Preprint
Published: 2023
Subjects:
Online Access:https://arxiv.org/abs/2303.13295
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author Hu, Xiaoxiao
Lei, Haoran
author_facet Hu, Xiaoxiao
Lei, Haoran
contents A multiproduct seller is more informed than consumers about the value of her products to consumers. The seller posts a price list and segments the market through cheap-talk communication. We find that when both seller's and consumers' incentive-compatibility constraints are satisfied, the seller cannot benefit from personalized pricing (i.e., third-degree price discrimination). Based on that observation, we provide a tractable characterization of seller's maximum equilibrium profits. We apply our analysis to a credence-good setup and discuss when the credence goods seller benefits from communication. The irrelevance result breaks down when we relax seller's incentive-compatibility constraints.
format Preprint
id arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2303_13295
institution arXiv
publishDate 2023
record_format arxiv
spellingShingle Irrelevance of personalized pricing under strategic market segmentation
Hu, Xiaoxiao
Lei, Haoran
Theoretical Economics
A multiproduct seller is more informed than consumers about the value of her products to consumers. The seller posts a price list and segments the market through cheap-talk communication. We find that when both seller's and consumers' incentive-compatibility constraints are satisfied, the seller cannot benefit from personalized pricing (i.e., third-degree price discrimination). Based on that observation, we provide a tractable characterization of seller's maximum equilibrium profits. We apply our analysis to a credence-good setup and discuss when the credence goods seller benefits from communication. The irrelevance result breaks down when we relax seller's incentive-compatibility constraints.
title Irrelevance of personalized pricing under strategic market segmentation
topic Theoretical Economics
url https://arxiv.org/abs/2303.13295