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| Hauptverfasser: | , , , , |
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| Format: | Preprint |
| Veröffentlicht: |
2023
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| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | https://arxiv.org/abs/2303.17790 |
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| _version_ | 1866911801924386816 |
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| author | Chremos, Ioannis Vasileios Bang, Heeseung Dave, Aditya Le, Viet-Anh Malikopoulos, Andreas A. |
| author_facet | Chremos, Ioannis Vasileios Bang, Heeseung Dave, Aditya Le, Viet-Anh Malikopoulos, Andreas A. |
| contents | In this paper, we present a study of a mobility game with uncertainty in the decision-making of travelers and incorporate prospect theory to model travel behavior. We formulate a mobility game that models how travelers distribute their traffic flows in a transportation network with splittable traffic, utilizing the Bureau of Public Roads function to establish the relationship between traffic flow and travel time cost. Given the inherent non-linearities and complexity introduced by the uncertainties, we propose a smooth approximation function to estimate the prospect-theoretic cost functions. As part of our analysis, we characterize the best-fit parameters and derive an upper bound for the error. We then show the existence of an equilibrium and its its best-possible approximation. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2303_17790 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2023 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | A Study of an Atomic Mobility Game With Uncertainty Under Prospect Theory Chremos, Ioannis Vasileios Bang, Heeseung Dave, Aditya Le, Viet-Anh Malikopoulos, Andreas A. Systems and Control In this paper, we present a study of a mobility game with uncertainty in the decision-making of travelers and incorporate prospect theory to model travel behavior. We formulate a mobility game that models how travelers distribute their traffic flows in a transportation network with splittable traffic, utilizing the Bureau of Public Roads function to establish the relationship between traffic flow and travel time cost. Given the inherent non-linearities and complexity introduced by the uncertainties, we propose a smooth approximation function to estimate the prospect-theoretic cost functions. As part of our analysis, we characterize the best-fit parameters and derive an upper bound for the error. We then show the existence of an equilibrium and its its best-possible approximation. |
| title | A Study of an Atomic Mobility Game With Uncertainty Under Prospect Theory |
| topic | Systems and Control |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2303.17790 |