Quantum Public-Key Encryption with Tamper-Resilient Public Keys from One-Way Functions

Fuente: arXiv
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Hauptverfasser: Kitagawa, Fuyuki, Morimae, Tomoyuki, Nishimaki, Ryo, Yamakawa, Takashi
Format: Preprint
Veröffentlicht: 2023
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author Kitagawa, Fuyuki
Morimae, Tomoyuki
Nishimaki, Ryo
Yamakawa, Takashi
author_facet Kitagawa, Fuyuki
Morimae, Tomoyuki
Nishimaki, Ryo
Yamakawa, Takashi
contents We construct quantum public-key encryption from one-way functions. In our construction, public keys are quantum, but ciphertexts are classical. Quantum public-key encryption from one-way functions (or weaker primitives such as pseudorandom function-like states) are also proposed in some recent works [Morimae-Yamakawa, eprint:2022/1336; Coladangelo, eprint:2023/282; Barooti-Grilo-Malavolta-Sattath-Vu-Walter, eprint:2023/877]. However, they have a huge drawback: they are secure only when quantum public keys can be transmitted to the sender (who runs the encryption algorithm) without being tampered with by the adversary, which seems to require unsatisfactory physical setup assumptions such as secure quantum channels. Our construction is free from such a drawback: it guarantees the secrecy of the encrypted messages even if we assume only unauthenticated quantum channels. Thus, the encryption is done with adversarially tampered quantum public keys. Our construction is the first quantum public-key encryption that achieves the goal of classical public-key encryption, namely, to establish secure communication over insecure channels, based only on one-way functions. Moreover, we show a generic compiler to upgrade security against chosen plaintext attacks (CPA security) into security against chosen ciphertext attacks (CCA security) only using one-way functions. As a result, we obtain CCA secure quantum public-key encryption based only on one-way functions.
format Preprint
id arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2304_01800
institution arXiv
publishDate 2023
record_format arxiv
spellingShingle Quantum Public-Key Encryption with Tamper-Resilient Public Keys from One-Way Functions
Kitagawa, Fuyuki
Morimae, Tomoyuki
Nishimaki, Ryo
Yamakawa, Takashi
Quantum Physics
Computational Complexity
Cryptography and Security
We construct quantum public-key encryption from one-way functions. In our construction, public keys are quantum, but ciphertexts are classical. Quantum public-key encryption from one-way functions (or weaker primitives such as pseudorandom function-like states) are also proposed in some recent works [Morimae-Yamakawa, eprint:2022/1336; Coladangelo, eprint:2023/282; Barooti-Grilo-Malavolta-Sattath-Vu-Walter, eprint:2023/877]. However, they have a huge drawback: they are secure only when quantum public keys can be transmitted to the sender (who runs the encryption algorithm) without being tampered with by the adversary, which seems to require unsatisfactory physical setup assumptions such as secure quantum channels. Our construction is free from such a drawback: it guarantees the secrecy of the encrypted messages even if we assume only unauthenticated quantum channels. Thus, the encryption is done with adversarially tampered quantum public keys. Our construction is the first quantum public-key encryption that achieves the goal of classical public-key encryption, namely, to establish secure communication over insecure channels, based only on one-way functions. Moreover, we show a generic compiler to upgrade security against chosen plaintext attacks (CPA security) into security against chosen ciphertext attacks (CCA security) only using one-way functions. As a result, we obtain CCA secure quantum public-key encryption based only on one-way functions.
title Quantum Public-Key Encryption with Tamper-Resilient Public Keys from One-Way Functions
topic Quantum Physics
Computational Complexity
Cryptography and Security
url https://arxiv.org/abs/2304.01800