Covert learning and disclosure
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arXiv
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| Format: | Preprint |
| Published: |
2023
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| _version_ | 1866915574967173120 |
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| author | Escudé, Matteo |
| author_facet | Escudé, Matteo |
| contents | I study a model of information acquisition and transmission in which the sender's ability to misreport her findings is limited. The sender learns covertly, so a key observation is that in equilibrium she must be deterred from undetectably worsening the meaning of the messages she sends. This force substantially disciplines equilibrium beliefs and behavior: the receiver is maximally skeptical of what the sender claims and learns all discovered information. I exploit these equilibrium properties to characterize the sense in which the sender benefits from her claims being more verifiable, showing that this is akin to increasing her commitment power. Finally, I identify sender- and receiver-optimal falsification environments. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2304_02989 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2023 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Covert learning and disclosure Escudé, Matteo Theoretical Economics I study a model of information acquisition and transmission in which the sender's ability to misreport her findings is limited. The sender learns covertly, so a key observation is that in equilibrium she must be deterred from undetectably worsening the meaning of the messages she sends. This force substantially disciplines equilibrium beliefs and behavior: the receiver is maximally skeptical of what the sender claims and learns all discovered information. I exploit these equilibrium properties to characterize the sense in which the sender benefits from her claims being more verifiable, showing that this is akin to increasing her commitment power. Finally, I identify sender- and receiver-optimal falsification environments. |
| title | Covert learning and disclosure |
| topic | Theoretical Economics |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2304.02989 |