Iterated Revelation: How to Incentivize Experts to Reveal Novel Actions
Fuente:
arXiv
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| Autore principale: | |
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| Natura: | Preprint |
| Pubblicazione: |
2023
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| _version_ | 1866912498495520768 |
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| author | Piermont, Evan |
| author_facet | Piermont, Evan |
| contents | I examine how a decision maker can incentivize an expert to reveal novel actions, expanding the set from which he can choose, without making ex-ante commitments regarding as-of-yet unrevealed actions. The outcomes achievable by any (incentive compatible) mechanism are characterized by the iterated revelation protocol: a simple dynamic interaction where, each round, the expert reveals novel actions and the decision maker adds actions to a shortlist; when nothing novel is revealed, the mechanism ends with the expert choosing an action from the shortlist. Greedy strategies -- where the decision maker optimizes myopically -- delineate the decision maker's maximal payoff achievable by any efficient mechanism. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2304_05142 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2023 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Iterated Revelation: How to Incentivize Experts to Reveal Novel Actions Piermont, Evan Theoretical Economics I examine how a decision maker can incentivize an expert to reveal novel actions, expanding the set from which he can choose, without making ex-ante commitments regarding as-of-yet unrevealed actions. The outcomes achievable by any (incentive compatible) mechanism are characterized by the iterated revelation protocol: a simple dynamic interaction where, each round, the expert reveals novel actions and the decision maker adds actions to a shortlist; when nothing novel is revealed, the mechanism ends with the expert choosing an action from the shortlist. Greedy strategies -- where the decision maker optimizes myopically -- delineate the decision maker's maximal payoff achievable by any efficient mechanism. |
| title | Iterated Revelation: How to Incentivize Experts to Reveal Novel Actions |
| topic | Theoretical Economics |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2304.05142 |