Test-Optional Admissions

Fuente: arXiv
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Hauptverfasser: Dessein, Wouter, Frankel, Alex, Kartik, Navin
Format: Preprint
Veröffentlicht: 2023
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author Dessein, Wouter
Frankel, Alex
Kartik, Navin
author_facet Dessein, Wouter
Frankel, Alex
Kartik, Navin
contents Many U.S. colleges now use test-optional admissions. A frequent claim is that by not seeing standardized test scores, a college can admit a student body it prefers, say with more diversity. But how can observing less information improve decisions? This paper proposes that test-optional policies are a response to social pressure on admission decisions. We model a college that bears disutility when it makes admission decisions that "society" dislikes. Going test optional allows the college to reduce its "disagreement cost". We analyze how missing scores are imputed and the consequences for the college, students, and society.
format Preprint
id arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2304_07551
institution arXiv
publishDate 2023
record_format arxiv
spellingShingle Test-Optional Admissions
Dessein, Wouter
Frankel, Alex
Kartik, Navin
Theoretical Economics
Many U.S. colleges now use test-optional admissions. A frequent claim is that by not seeing standardized test scores, a college can admit a student body it prefers, say with more diversity. But how can observing less information improve decisions? This paper proposes that test-optional policies are a response to social pressure on admission decisions. We model a college that bears disutility when it makes admission decisions that "society" dislikes. Going test optional allows the college to reduce its "disagreement cost". We analyze how missing scores are imputed and the consequences for the college, students, and society.
title Test-Optional Admissions
topic Theoretical Economics
url https://arxiv.org/abs/2304.07551