Unlocking Democratic Efficiency: How Coordinated Outcome-Contingent Promises Shape Decisions
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arXiv
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| Format: | Preprint |
| Published: |
2023
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| _version_ | 1866909611443879936 |
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| author | Lazrak, Ali Zhang, Jianfeng |
| author_facet | Lazrak, Ali Zhang, Jianfeng |
| contents | We consider a committee voting on whether to adopt a reform under a quota rule, where members differ in how much they value the reform some supporting it, others opposing it. We examine how members can influence each other's votes through coordinated non-negative transfer promises, made prior to voting and contingent on the vote outcome. In equilibrium, these transfers are structured to prevent any coalition from profitably deviating in a coordinated way, while minimizing total transfers. We provide a complete characterization of these `strong' equilibria and show that they exist, are indeterminate, efficient, and involve transfers from high- to low-utility members. Such transfers prevent opponents from swaying less enthusiastic supporters and may be directed not only to opponents but also to lukewarm supporters. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2304_08008 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2023 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Unlocking Democratic Efficiency: How Coordinated Outcome-Contingent Promises Shape Decisions Lazrak, Ali Zhang, Jianfeng General Economics Economics We consider a committee voting on whether to adopt a reform under a quota rule, where members differ in how much they value the reform some supporting it, others opposing it. We examine how members can influence each other's votes through coordinated non-negative transfer promises, made prior to voting and contingent on the vote outcome. In equilibrium, these transfers are structured to prevent any coalition from profitably deviating in a coordinated way, while minimizing total transfers. We provide a complete characterization of these `strong' equilibria and show that they exist, are indeterminate, efficient, and involve transfers from high- to low-utility members. Such transfers prevent opponents from swaying less enthusiastic supporters and may be directed not only to opponents but also to lukewarm supporters. |
| title | Unlocking Democratic Efficiency: How Coordinated Outcome-Contingent Promises Shape Decisions |
| topic | General Economics Economics |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2304.08008 |