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Autori principali: Pulyassary, Haripriya, Yang, Ruifan, Zhang, Zhanhao, Wu, Manxi
Natura: Preprint
Pubblicazione: 2023
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Accesso online:https://arxiv.org/abs/2304.09234
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author Pulyassary, Haripriya
Yang, Ruifan
Zhang, Zhanhao
Wu, Manxi
author_facet Pulyassary, Haripriya
Yang, Ruifan
Zhang, Zhanhao
Wu, Manxi
contents In this article, we study the optimal design of High Occupancy Toll (HOT) lanes. In our setup, the traffic authority determines the road capacity allocation between HOT lanes and ordinary lanes, as well as the toll price charged for travelers who use the HOT lanes but do not meet the high-occupancy eligibility criteria. We build a game-theoretic model to analyze the decisions made by travelers with heterogeneous values of time and carpool disutilities, who choose between paying or forming carpools to take the HOT lanes, or taking the ordinary lanes. Travelers' payoffs depend on the congestion cost of the lane that they take, the payment and the carpool disutilities. We provide a complete characterization of travelers' equilibrium strategies and resulting travel times for any capacity allocation and toll price. We also calibrate our model on the California Interstate highway 880 and compute the optimal capacity allocation and toll design.
format Preprint
id arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2304_09234
institution arXiv
publishDate 2023
record_format arxiv
spellingShingle Capacity Allocation and Pricing of High Occupancy Toll Lane Systems with Heterogeneous Travelers
Pulyassary, Haripriya
Yang, Ruifan
Zhang, Zhanhao
Wu, Manxi
Multiagent Systems
In this article, we study the optimal design of High Occupancy Toll (HOT) lanes. In our setup, the traffic authority determines the road capacity allocation between HOT lanes and ordinary lanes, as well as the toll price charged for travelers who use the HOT lanes but do not meet the high-occupancy eligibility criteria. We build a game-theoretic model to analyze the decisions made by travelers with heterogeneous values of time and carpool disutilities, who choose between paying or forming carpools to take the HOT lanes, or taking the ordinary lanes. Travelers' payoffs depend on the congestion cost of the lane that they take, the payment and the carpool disutilities. We provide a complete characterization of travelers' equilibrium strategies and resulting travel times for any capacity allocation and toll price. We also calibrate our model on the California Interstate highway 880 and compute the optimal capacity allocation and toll design.
title Capacity Allocation and Pricing of High Occupancy Toll Lane Systems with Heterogeneous Travelers
topic Multiagent Systems
url https://arxiv.org/abs/2304.09234