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| Autori principali: | , |
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| Natura: | Preprint |
| Pubblicazione: |
2023
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| Soggetti: | |
| Accesso online: | https://arxiv.org/abs/2304.12234 |
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| _version_ | 1866910320294887424 |
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| author | Mane, Pramod C. Ratnaparkhi, Snehal |
| author_facet | Mane, Pramod C. Ratnaparkhi, Snehal |
| contents | The problem of how to achieve cooperation among rational peers in order to discourage free riding is one that has received a lot of attention in peer-to-peer computing and is still an important one. The field of game theory is applied to the task of finding solutions that will encourage cooperation while discouraging free riding. The cooperative conduct of peers is typically portrayed as a traditional version of the game known as the "Prisoners' Dilemma." It is common knowledge that if two peers engage in a situation known as the Prisoner's Dilemma more than once, collaboration can be achieved through the use of punishment. Nevertheless, this is not the case when there is only one interaction between peers. This short article demonstrates that Kantian peers prefer to cooperate and attain social welfare even when they interacted only once. This, dissuade peers from freeriding. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2304_12234 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2023 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Peer-to-Peer Network: Kantian Cooperation Discourage Free Riding Mane, Pramod C. Ratnaparkhi, Snehal Computer Science and Game Theory The problem of how to achieve cooperation among rational peers in order to discourage free riding is one that has received a lot of attention in peer-to-peer computing and is still an important one. The field of game theory is applied to the task of finding solutions that will encourage cooperation while discouraging free riding. The cooperative conduct of peers is typically portrayed as a traditional version of the game known as the "Prisoners' Dilemma." It is common knowledge that if two peers engage in a situation known as the Prisoner's Dilemma more than once, collaboration can be achieved through the use of punishment. Nevertheless, this is not the case when there is only one interaction between peers. This short article demonstrates that Kantian peers prefer to cooperate and attain social welfare even when they interacted only once. This, dissuade peers from freeriding. |
| title | Peer-to-Peer Network: Kantian Cooperation Discourage Free Riding |
| topic | Computer Science and Game Theory |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2304.12234 |