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Lemonade from Lemons: Information Design and Adverse Selection

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors:	Kartik, Navin, Zhong, Weijie
Format:	Preprint
Published:	2023
Subjects:	Theoretical Economics
Online Access:	Acceder al recurso
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