Robust Regulation of Firms' Access to Consumer Data
Fuente:
arXiv
Guardado en:
| Autor principal: | |
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| Formato: | Preprint |
| Publicado: |
2023
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| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | |
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| _version_ | 1866908572170846208 |
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| author | Higueras, Jose |
| author_facet | Higueras, Jose |
| contents | I study how to regulate firms' access to consumer data when a regulator faces non-Bayesian uncertainty about how firms will exploit the consumer's information to segment the market and set prices. I fully characterize all worst-case optimal policies when the regulator maximizes consumer surplus: the regulator allows a firm to access data only if the firm cannot use the database to identify a small group of consumers. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2305_05822 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2023 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Robust Regulation of Firms' Access to Consumer Data Higueras, Jose Theoretical Economics I study how to regulate firms' access to consumer data when a regulator faces non-Bayesian uncertainty about how firms will exploit the consumer's information to segment the market and set prices. I fully characterize all worst-case optimal policies when the regulator maximizes consumer surplus: the regulator allows a firm to access data only if the firm cannot use the database to identify a small group of consumers. |
| title | Robust Regulation of Firms' Access to Consumer Data |
| topic | Theoretical Economics |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2305.05822 |