Truthful Two-Facility Location with Candidate Locations
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arXiv
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| Main Authors: | , , |
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| Format: | Preprint |
| Published: |
2023
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| _version_ | 1866929203198296064 |
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| author | Kanellopoulos, Panagiotis Voudouris, Alexandros A. Zhang, Rongsen |
| author_facet | Kanellopoulos, Panagiotis Voudouris, Alexandros A. Zhang, Rongsen |
| contents | We study a truthful two-facility location problem in which a set of agents have private positions on the line of real numbers and known approval preferences over two different facilities. Given the locations of the two facilities, the cost of an agent is the total distance from the facilities she approves. The goal is to decide where to place the facilities from a given finite set of candidate locations so as to (a) approximately optimize desired social objectives, and (b) incentivize the agents to truthfully report their private positions. We focus on the class of deterministic strategyproof mechanisms and show bounds on their approximation ratio in terms of the social cost (i.e., the total cost of the agents) and the max cost for several classes of instances depending on the preferences of the agents over the facilities. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2305_07525 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2023 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Truthful Two-Facility Location with Candidate Locations Kanellopoulos, Panagiotis Voudouris, Alexandros A. Zhang, Rongsen Computer Science and Game Theory We study a truthful two-facility location problem in which a set of agents have private positions on the line of real numbers and known approval preferences over two different facilities. Given the locations of the two facilities, the cost of an agent is the total distance from the facilities she approves. The goal is to decide where to place the facilities from a given finite set of candidate locations so as to (a) approximately optimize desired social objectives, and (b) incentivize the agents to truthfully report their private positions. We focus on the class of deterministic strategyproof mechanisms and show bounds on their approximation ratio in terms of the social cost (i.e., the total cost of the agents) and the max cost for several classes of instances depending on the preferences of the agents over the facilities. |
| title | Truthful Two-Facility Location with Candidate Locations |
| topic | Computer Science and Game Theory |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2305.07525 |