Imagen de Portada

The Machine Psychology of Cooperation: Can GPT models operationalise prompts for altruism, cooperation, competitiveness and selfishness in economic games?

Fuente: arXiv

Guardado en:

Detalles Bibliográficos
Autores principales:	Phelps, Steve, Russell, Yvan I.
Formato:	Preprint
Publicado:	2023
Materias:	Computer Science and Game Theory Artificial Intelligence Computers and Society General Economics Economics I.2.0
Acceso en línea:	Acceder al recurso
Etiquetas:	Agregar Etiqueta Sin Etiquetas, Sea el primero en etiquetar este registro!

Ejemplares similares

Can AI with High Reasoning Ability Replicate Human-like Decision Making in Economic Experiments?
por: Kitadai, Ayato, et al.
Publicado: (2024)

Zero-determinant strategies in iterated multi-strategy games
por: Guo, Jin-Li
Publicado: (2014)

A techno-economic model for avoiding conflicts of interest between owners of offshore wind farms and maintenance suppliers
por: Marugán, Alberto Pliego, et al.
Publicado: (2024)

Real-time Facial Communication Restores Cooperation After Defection in Social Dilemmas
por: Oudah, Mayada, et al.
Publicado: (2026)

Mobility-as-a-service (MaaS) system as a multi-leader-multi-follower game: A single-level variational inequality (VI) formulation
por: Yao, Rui, et al.
Publicado: (2026)

Economic DAO Governance: A Contestable Control Approach
por: Strnad, Jeff
Publicado: (2024)

Market Power and Platform Design in Decentralized Electricity Trading
por: Eschenbaum, Nicolas, et al.
Publicado: (2026)

Optimal Mechanism in a Dynamic Stochastic Knapsack Environment
por: Jung, Jihyeok, et al.
Publicado: (2024)

Algorithmic Collusion And The Minimum Price Markov Game
por: Sadoune, Igor, et al.
Publicado: (2024)

Multi Agent Influence Diagrams for DeFi Governance
por: Nag, Abhimanyu, et al.
Publicado: (2024)

Evaluating the Efficiency of Regulation in Matching Markets with Distributional Disparities
por: Ikegami, Kei, et al.
Publicado: (2022)

Algorithmic Predation: Equilibrium Analysis in Dynamic Oligopolies with Smooth Market Sharing
por: Pieroth, Fabian Raoul, et al.
Publicado: (2025)

Strategic Interactions in Academic Dishonesty: A Game-Theoretic Analysis of the Exam Script Swapping Mechanism
por: Ganuthula, Venkat Ram Reddy, et al.
Publicado: (2025)

The museum pass problem with consortia
por: Gonçalves-Dosantos, Juan Carlos, et al.
Publicado: (2024)

Describing Deferred Acceptance and Strategyproofness to Participants: Experimental Analysis
por: Gonczarowski, Yannai A., et al.
Publicado: (2024)

How Wasteful is Signaling?
por: Frankel, Alex, et al.
Publicado: (2026)

Towards Replication-Robust Analytics Markets
por: Falconer, Thomas, et al.
Publicado: (2023)

Restricting Entries to All-Pay Contests
por: Sun, Fupeng, et al.
Publicado: (2022)

Data-Driven Mechanism Design using Multi-Agent Revealed Preferences
por: Snow, Luke, et al.
Publicado: (2024)

A General Framework for Optimizing and Learning Nash Equilibrium
por: Zhang, Di, et al.
Publicado: (2024)

Bidders' Responses to Auction Format Change in Internet Display Advertising Auctions
por: Goke, Shumpei, et al.
Publicado: (2021)

Cryptoeconomics and Tokenomics as Economics: A Survey with Opinions
por: Ito, Kensuke
Publicado: (2024)

Normative Equivalence in Human-AI Cooperation: Behaviour, Not Identity, Drives Cooperation in Mixed-Agent Groups
por: Mutzner, Nico, et al.
Publicado: (2026)

Capturing the Complexity of Human Strategic Decision-Making with Machine Learning
por: Zhu, Jian-Qiao, et al.
Publicado: (2024)

Coevolution of cognition and cooperation in structured populations under reinforcement learning
por: Mastrandrea, Rossana, et al.
Publicado: (2023)

The Economics of Builder Saturation in Digital Markets
por: Catovic, Armin
Publicado: (2026)

A New Incentive Model For Content Trust
por: Barbosa, Lucas, et al.
Publicado: (2025)

Policy Design in Long-Run Welfare Dynamics
por: Wu, Jiduan, et al.
Publicado: (2025)

Externalities in Knowledge Production: Evidence from a Randomized Field Experiment
por: Hinnosaar, Marit, et al.
Publicado: (2019)

Algorithmic Collusion by Large Language Models
por: Fish, Sara, et al.
Publicado: (2024)

Approximate Revenue from Finite Range Mechanisms
por: Goswami, Mridu Prabal
Publicado: (2024)

Strategy-proof Selling: a Geometric Approach
por: Goswami, Mridu Prabal
Publicado: (2024)

Optimal Strategy-proof Mechanisms on Single-crossing Domains
por: Goswami, Mridu Prabal
Publicado: (2024)

Overcoming the Machine Penalty with Imperfectly Fair AI Agents
por: Wang, Zhen, et al.
Publicado: (2024)

Repetitive Dilemma Games in Distribution Information Using Interplay of Droop Quota: Meek's Method in Impact of Maximum Compensation and Minimum Cost Routes in Information Role of Marginal Contribution in Two-Sided Matching Markets
por: Kawahata, Yasuko
Publicado: (2024)

Learning to Charge More: A Theoretical Study of Collusion by Q-Learning Agents
por: Chica, Cristian, et al.
Publicado: (2025)

Tacit Bidder-Side Collusion: Artificial Intelligence in Dynamic Auctions
por: Tolety, Sriram
Publicado: (2025)

Bridging the Gap Between Estimated and True Regret Towards Reliable Regret Estimation in Deep Learning based Mechanism Design
por: You, Shuyuan, et al.
Publicado: (2026)

An AI Capability Threshold for Rent-Funded Universal Basic Income in an AI-Automated Economy
por: Nayebi, Aran
Publicado: (2025)

Empirical Equilibria in Agent-based Economic systems with Learning agents
por: Dwarakanath, Kshama, et al.
Publicado: (2024)