A Theory of Auditability for Allocation Mechanisms
Fuente:
arXiv
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| Auteurs principaux: | , |
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| Format: | Preprint |
| Publié: |
2023
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| _version_ | 1866929346383446016 |
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| author | Grigoryan, Aram Möller, Markus |
| author_facet | Grigoryan, Aram Möller, Markus |
| contents | In centralized mechanisms and platforms, participants do not fully observe each others' type reports. Hence, if there is a deviation from the promised mechanism, participants may be unable to detect it. We formalize a notion of auditabilty that captures how easy or hard it is to detect deviations from a mechanism. We find a stark contrast between the auditabilities of prominent mechanisms. We also provide tight characterizations of maximally auditable classes of allocation mechanisms. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2305_09314 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2023 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | A Theory of Auditability for Allocation Mechanisms Grigoryan, Aram Möller, Markus Theoretical Economics In centralized mechanisms and platforms, participants do not fully observe each others' type reports. Hence, if there is a deviation from the promised mechanism, participants may be unable to detect it. We formalize a notion of auditabilty that captures how easy or hard it is to detect deviations from a mechanism. We find a stark contrast between the auditabilities of prominent mechanisms. We also provide tight characterizations of maximally auditable classes of allocation mechanisms. |
| title | A Theory of Auditability for Allocation Mechanisms |
| topic | Theoretical Economics |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2305.09314 |